Introduction
How did Tony Blair and Gordon Brown see the world, and how many of their actions were driven by their personal constructions of the reality of foreign affairs? Was British foreign policy from 1997-2010 decisively shaped by the belief systems of the two Prime Ministers? The two were from the same political party, shared an ideological construct -'New Labour' -and dealt with many of the same international issues, particularly the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq bequeathed by Blair to Brown. A comparison of Blair and Brown comes tantalizingly close, then, to a natural experiment in which many factors potentially significant in shaping foreign policy (notably political party, ideology and external situation) are held within a tight range of variation, while the key variable of interest (the identity of the Prime Minister) changes. On that basis, this chapter tests the hypothesis that British foreign policy across the Blair and Brown eras can be at least partly explained with reference to their subjective internal representations of reality and the manner in which this shaped what they believed to be possible and desirable.
The chapter investigates the worldviews of Blair and Brown -and attempts to test the strength of the above claim -in three parts. First, it discusses the role leaders play in shaping state foreign policy. I strongly support the editors' framework of 'identity, ethics and power' (IEP, see Chapter 1) as a means of understanding UK foreign policy, but would offer an advance upon it: identity, ethics, and power are 'free-floating' ideas (or, in the case of the latter, an idea with a strong material underpinning) that are given motive force in political action by the interpretations and reformulations of statesmen. These leaders act, I argue, as the 'locus of integration' of the material and ideational impulses which bear upon a state. Crucially, the shape of that integration is decisively determined by what the leaders themselves bring to the mix in terms of pre-existing cognitive frameworks, characteristic approaches to problems of political action, and baseline personality traits. Thus, each leader will perceive the imperatives of identity, ethics, and power in a unique fashion, and will process these inputs in idiosyncratic ways to produce a worldview. This worldview is then the basis for the foreign policy choices leaders make.
The second part elaborates a method of measuring the worldviews and belief systems of political leaders through content analysis of their verbal output on foreign affairs. Through analysis of the entirety of their responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons, this mode of investigation allows us to pinpoint the subjective conceptions of reality that formed the basis of Blair and Brown's engagement with the world. In the third and fourth parts, the impact upon British foreign policy of the Prime Ministers' respective beliefs is reconstructed. I find that Blair held a subjective view of the world as one driven by conflict and believed that Britain had to respond in kind. Blair's view of political life was stark and based around blunt, blackand-white representations of other actors, and he believed himself and the UK to be both efficacious in international affairs and best-suited to a proactive, engaged stance. In the nomenclature of the IEP framework developed in this book, Blair believed Britain's identity demanded an engaged, proactive approach to the world; his ethics were those of a Manichean moralist; and his views on power were that one needed it in a dangerous world and, since the Americans had the most of it, it was a good idea to be friends with them and do most of what they say. These proclivities helped mould his policies toward Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Brown cleaved to a very different worldview. He saw the world as much more driven by cooperation than conflict, and as a more complicated place than Blair. His worldview stressed not power politics but interconnectedness and complexity. He shared with Blair, though, a belief that the UK was an important state in global terms and that British interests were best served through a proactive, engaged foreign policy. In terms of the IEP framework, he saw Britain's identity as that of a hub for and facilitator of globalization and global development; his
